MY Kanga Garage Fire: Lithium Battery Lessons for Yacht Teams

Applicability depends on flag state, yacht code, class, battery type and size, storage location, charging arrangements, fire detection, ventilation, suppression system, guest equipment policy, and whether the incident caused injury, evacuation, pollution risk, structural damage, or loss of safe operation.

MY Kanga is one of the most directly relevant public yacht fire investigations for modern superyacht operations. It involved a yacht garage, water-sports equipment, lithium-ion battery packs, detection limits, ventilation-control questions, crew risk awareness, and a fire that escalated beyond crew control.

This is exactly the risk profile many yachts now carry. Electric surfboards, e-foils, scooters, underwater scooters, drones, electric tenders, guest devices, tool batteries, UPS units, portable power packs, and spare battery cases are often introduced after build or during refit. They are sometimes treated as toys, not as stored energy systems.

The Kanga lesson is not "ban lithium batteries." It is that lithium-powered equipment must be managed as a fire-risk system: procurement, storage, charging, damage reporting, quarantine, detection, ventilation, suppression, crew training, and emergency response.

On the morning of 7 September 2018, MY Kanga was at anchor in the coastal area of Dubrovnik, Croatia. The fire started in the yacht's garage. The garage contained water-sports and tender-related equipment, including electric surfboards and their lithium-ion battery packs.

The garage had multiple power outlets. The MSIU report recorded that two 220 V sockets were used to recharge electric surfboard battery packs, while other sockets were used to recharge underwater scooters. According to the crew, none of the equipment or batteries was being recharged at the time of the occurrence, and the garage extraction fan was running.

That detail is important. The fire was not simply a charging-fire story. It was a storage, condition, detection, ventilation, and risk-assessment story.

The first officer was on the bridge when the fire panel indicated a fire in the garage. He went to inspect and was met by heat and smoke. The main fire alarm was then triggered, and crew and passengers were called to muster at the bow.

An attempt was made to fight the fire, but it was unsuccessful. The fire rose toward the upper decks, developed beyond control, and the yacht was abandoned on the master's order. No injuries were reported.

The MSIU investigation concluded that, in all probability, the seat of the fire was the lithium-ion batteries. The exact seat of the fire was not established with absolute certainty, but the investigation focused on the leaking battery packs of the electric surfboards because of their condition, location, and the fire-protection arrangements in the garage.

Kanga had four lithium-ion battery packs for the electric surfboards. The MSIU report listed key specifications for those packs, including nominal voltage of 44.4 V, rated capacity of 1500 Wh, approximate recharge time of 120 minutes, and weight of about 10 kg.

The battery manufacturer provided precautions. The guidance warned that lithium-ion batteries have been known to catch fire and should always be recharged and stored under supervision in a dry and safe place. The guidance also stated that defective battery packs were not to be used or charged.

The crew had already experienced problems with the battery packs. Documentary evidence showed sea water leakage into three of the four battery packs. The crew had noticed brownish-coloured water leaking from inside the batteries and had notified the manufacturer that they intended to return the packs for repair or replacement. The manufacturer advised the crew to check the internal status of the battery packs before sending them back and also advised that defective battery packs were not to be used or charged.

This is the key pre-incident signal. Damaged or suspect lithium batteries were known to be onboard before the fire. They were not just theoretical hazards.

Lithium-ion batteries are different from many traditional onboard batteries because they contain stored chemical energy and flammable electrolyte. Damage, internal faults, contamination, or water ingress can create conditions for internal short-circuiting, heating, off-gassing, and thermal runaway.

Sea water ingress is particularly concerning because saline water is conductive and corrosive. If it enters a battery pack, it can damage internal components and increase the risk of electrical faults. Brownish-coloured fluid leaking from a battery pack should not be treated as ordinary water until proven otherwise.

For yacht teams, the lesson is simple: a leaking lithium battery pack is no longer a normal toy battery. It is a damaged energy-storage item requiring quarantine, specialist advice, and documented handling.

The MSIU investigation also looked at the protection fitted in the garage and the way the space was treated under the applicable yacht code framework.

The report identified that the garage space was not considered a service space within the meaning of the Commercial Yacht Code 2015. As a result, additional fire-protection measures to prevent spread and extinguish a fire were not deemed necessary for the garage in the same way they might have been for other spaces.

The report also discussed ventilation closure. SOLAS has requirements for closing main ventilation inlets and outlets from outside ventilated spaces, but the Commercial Yacht Code 2015 placed comparable requirements only on machinery spaces and galleys. The Code did not address ventilation closure from the standpoint of controlling air supply to a garage fire.

For Kanga, the garage ventilation grid had a removable shutter rather than the kind of permanently attached closure arrangement that would provide a clearer fire-control barrier. The practical issue is that ventilation can support fire growth if the crew cannot close it quickly and safely from outside the affected space.

The MSIU report identified that the only means of detecting a fire in the garage were a photoelectric smoke detector and fire patrols. There was no gas detector fitted in the garage. A gas detector may have provided earlier warning of an abnormal condition before smoke detection activated.

This matters because lithium battery incidents can involve off-gassing before visible smoke and flame. A smoke detector may not be early enough if the space contains high-energy batteries and combustible equipment. CCTV, thermal monitoring, gas/off-gas detection, and more frequent patrols may all be relevant depending on the yacht's layout and battery load.

The lesson is not that every yacht garage must have the same detection package. The lesson is that detection should match the hazard being stored.

The Kanga causal chain can be understood as several connected layers.

First, lithium-ion battery packs for electric surfboards were stored in the garage.

Second, three of four battery packs had shown signs of seawater leakage and brownish fluid. That made them suspect or defective battery packs, not ordinary serviceable equipment.

Third, the crew did not seem fully aware of the hazards associated with lithium-ion batteries, according to the MSIU report. That reduced the quality of the onboard risk assessment, even after the battery leakage was known.

Fourth, the garage was not treated as a higher-fire-risk service space under the applicable yacht code framework, so additional fire spread prevention and extinguishing measures were not required in that space.

Fifth, the detection arrangement relied on smoke detection and fire patrols, without gas detection that might have provided earlier warning.

Sixth, ventilation closure arrangements did not provide the same fire-control standard as machinery-space or galley ventilation closure requirements.

Seventh, once the fire developed, crew response was not able to control it, the fire spread toward upper decks, and the yacht was abandoned.

The fire was therefore not only a battery issue. It was a battery condition, awareness, storage, detection, ventilation, and regulatory-gap issue.

Damaged Batteries Need A Different Status

On many yachts, water toys move quickly between guest use, washdown, charging, stowage, and repair. Damaged or suspect battery packs can easily remain in the same storage routine because no one formally changes their status.

That should not happen. A battery showing leakage, swelling, impact damage, water ingress, abnormal heat, abnormal smell, charging fault, or manufacturer warning should become a controlled item.

Controlled means:

• Removed from normal use.
• Labelled as suspect or damaged.
• Stored in an agreed quarantine location.
• Not charged.
• Not left in a guest or crew area.
• Reported to the chief engineer or responsible technical person.
• Handled according to manufacturer and competent-specialist advice.

Manufacturer Warnings Must Become Yacht Procedures

Manufacturer instructions are often received with the toy, filed with manuals, or left in a box. That is not enough.

If the manufacturer says damaged packs must not be charged, the yacht needs an onboard procedure that says who identifies damage, who removes the pack from service, where it goes, who informs the manufacturer, and who authorises return to service or disposal.

Fire Detection Must Match Stored Energy

A garage designed around petrol toys may not automatically be suitable for electric toys. A garage designed around water-sports convenience may not be suitable for storing multiple high-energy battery packs.

Yacht teams should assess:

• Battery capacity and chemistry.
• Number of packs stored.
• Charging location.
• Ventilation path.
• Smoke detection.
• Gas/off-gas detection.
• CCTV or thermal monitoring.
• Fire patrol frequency.
• Suppression suitability.
• Crew access and escape route exposure.

Ventilation Can Become A Fire-Control Problem

Ventilation is helpful during normal operations and charging, but during fire it can support spread if it cannot be isolated. The Kanga report's discussion of ventilation closure is important because yacht garages often have airflow paths, louvres, shutters, beach-club openings, tender doors, and service penetrations.

The question for yacht teams is not simply "is there ventilation?" It is:

• Can the ventilation be closed from outside the space?
• Is the closing device permanently attached and easy to operate?
• Does the crew know when to close it?
• Does closing ventilation affect smoke extraction, battery off-gassing, or firefighting tactics?
• Is the arrangement documented in the fire response plan?

Crew Awareness Is A Control Barrier

The report identified insufficient crew awareness of lithium-ion battery hazards. That is a management issue, not just a deckhand training issue.

Crew need to understand:

• What a damaged lithium battery looks like.
• Why water ingress matters.
• Why a suspect battery should not be charged.
• Why a battery can reignite or continue generating heat.
• What gases and vapours may be produced.
• When to isolate, cool, monitor, evacuate, or call for specialist help.

1. Create A Battery Inventory

List every significant battery-powered toy and spare pack:

• E-foils.
• Electric surfboards.
• Underwater scooters.
• Drones.
• Electric scooters.
• Electric tenders.
• Portable power stations.
• Tool batteries.
• UPS battery packs in AV/IT spaces.

Include owner, location, chemistry where known, capacity, charger, serial number, inspection date, and responsible crew member.

2. Create A Damaged-Battery Quarantine Procedure

A damaged-battery procedure should define:

• Signs of damage.
• Immediate action.
• Where the battery is moved, if safe.
• When it must not be moved.
• Who is notified.
• Whether charging is prohibited.
• How the manufacturer is contacted.
• How disposal or return is arranged.
• What evidence is photographed and logged.

3. Review Charging Locations

Charging locations should be selected for fire consequence, not convenience.

Avoid charging:

• In guest cabins.
• In escape routes.
• In lockers with soft goods.
• Near fuel, solvents, aerosols, or cleaning products.
• Under beds, sofas, or interior joinery.
• In unmonitored beach-club or garage spaces without detection.

4. Match Detection To Battery Risk

Depending on the yacht and the battery load, consider:

• Smoke detection.
• Heat detection.
• Gas/off-gas detection.
• CCTV.
• Thermal camera checks.
• Patrol routines.
• Remote alerting to crew phones or engineers' panels.

Detection should alert crew before the fire is already beyond a safe first response.

5. Review Garage Fire Protection

If electric craft are stored in a garage, review:

• Fire boundaries.
• Door and hatch closing.
• Ventilation shutoff.
• Drainage.
• Suppression system.
• Fire patrol access.
• CCTV visibility.
• Battery storage cabinets or boxes.
• Separation from tenders, fuel, and combustible equipment.

6. Train Crew On Lithium Battery Events

Training should cover:

• Signs of battery distress.
• Smoke versus off-gassing.
• Thermal runaway.
• Re-ignition risk.
• PPE and respiratory risk.
• Cooling strategy.
• When not to enter.
• When to muster and evacuate.
• Evidence preservation after the event.

If a yacht has a fire, smoke, overheating, off-gassing, or damaged-battery event, preserve evidence before the space is cleaned or equipment is discarded.

Minimum evidence:

• Photos of battery location before movement, if safe.
• Battery labels, charger labels, serial numbers, and manufacturer instructions.
• Inspection notes for leakage, swelling, impact, corrosion, water ingress, or smell.
• Charging state and charger connection status.
• CCTV and fire-panel timestamps.
• Detector type and activation sequence.
• Ventilation status and closure actions.
• Firefighting actions and extinguishing medium used.
• Thermal camera readings during cooldown.
• Names of batteries removed, cooled, quarantined, disposed, or handed to authorities.

Corrective action should address both the immediate device and the onboard system.

Examples:

• Remove damaged batteries from service.
• Create battery inventory and quarantine log.
• Update water-toy SOPs.
• Add battery inspection to daily or weekly routines during guest operations.
• Improve garage detection and surveillance.
• Review ventilation closures.
• Add battery fire response to drills.
• Require manufacturer guidance to be built into onboard procedures.
• Review insurance, flag, class, and manager expectations for lithium equipment storage.